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‘We learn to think of our desires in terms of the commodities produced to 
meet them, we learn to think of our problems in terms of the commodities 
by which to solve them.’ (John Fiske, 1990: 182)
Over the past ten years, conspicuously new images of and discourses on 
gender have appeared in Irish shopping malls, on Irish billboards, in the 
Irish news and entertainment media and on the shelves of Irish bookshops. 
Radio shows, television programmes, online chat-rooms, magazines, 
daily newspapers and self-help books are all increasingly populated by a 
range of new male and female typologies: from new men, new lads and 
metro sexuals to domestic goddesses, desperate housewives and yummy 
mummies. This chapter looks at how the recent rise in consumerism is 
affecting the ways in which we mediate and talk about gender behav-
iours, identities and relationships in contem porary Ireland. It maps out a 
number of key debates in contemporary gender studies and considers how 
the changes discussed here are likely to affect Irish society unless proactive 
measures are taken to ensure a more egalitarian gender order. Many of the 
developments discussed here, enmeshed as they are in global cultural proc-
esses, are not specific to Ireland. However, their reception in and impact 
on a society which, like all others, has its own history of gender relations, 
and thus its own unique ‘gender-scape’, is of obvious concern to anyone 
with an interest in social and cultural change in Ireland.
The changes addressed here are the result of a number of mutually 
compatible developments, the most noteworthy of which are: firstly, the 
decline in western societies of second-wave feminism and its replacement 
with a broadly post-feminist cultural discourse (Tasker and negra, 2007); 
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secondly, the growing popularity of bio-determinist discourses on gender;1 
and thirdly, the move towards an increasingly commercial media-scape. 
Although recent statistics on gender in Ireland and the rest of europe 
point to significant equality deficits,2 a new (liberal) discourse of progress 
has emerged in relation to gender in post-Celtic-Tiger Ireland which has 
little to do with material (in)equality or the representation of citizens in 
the public sphere. Within this new rhetoric, freedom is understood less as 
the legacy of second-wave feminism and increasingly as something given 
to us by an open, liberal market, which celebrates female empowerment 
in the form of ‘girl power’, is inclusive of sexual diversity and ironicises the 
antiquated sexism of a bygone era. Indeed, as this chapter will demonstrate, 
much recent debate about gender in Ireland is underpinned – both implic-
itly and explicitly – by the assumption that equality is a fait accompli and 
that feminism’s work is done. However, contrary to the justifiable assump-
tion that such a climate of post-feminism might render gender issues less 
prevalent in popular imagery and discourse, the opposite is in fact the case. 
In recent years the popular media have displayed a near hysteria with the 
obsolescence of gender equality on the one hand, while actively reviving a 
‘war-of-the-sexes’ discourse on the other.
In tandem with this development, ironic sexism and stereotypes have 
made a spectacular comeback in the entertainment media, with large-
breasted, pouting babes in hotpants at one end of the spectrum and 
emotionally challenged hard men hell-bent on the adolescent pleasures 
of ‘Lad-land’ (cars, soccer, beer, gangsters and pornography) at the other. 
This repolarisation of gender identities is particularly evident in the 
dominance of an aggressive but allegedly ironic ‘gender war’ rhetoric, 
which pervades all aspects of media culture, from advertising copy to 
radio quizzes: women and men are pitted against one another in a bid 
to see, it would seem, which set of stereotypical traits is ‘better’. The 
irony underpinning this new, brash sexism lies in the claim that the 
stereotyping of women as obsessive shoppers or shoe fetishists and of men 
as domestically inept, relationship-averse larger-louts is so blatant and so 
passé that we can now laugh at its anachronisms. This, however, is where 
the paradoxes of the irony argument begin: because precisely this type 
of essentialist thinking about gender is now emerging in more serious 
fora, which serve not only to challenge social construction theory but 
also to rationalise and justify the gender stereotypes that contemporary 
advertising both lampoons and simultaneously reaffirms. 
Gender has become an increasingly popular prism through which to 
view a broad range of contemporary social ills, many of which might be 
better explained by using other analytical variables, such as class, ethnicity 
or sexuality. Thus, suicide, anti-social behaviour and academic under-
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achievement are increasingly discussed in male-versus-female – rather than 
in class-based – terms. In addition to this centre-staging of gender is 
another striking development, namely the growing prevalence of essen-
tialist or bio-determinist accounts of gender difference. This is increasingly 
evident not only in the ostensibly ironic gender stereotyping that has 
become a key feature of popular cultural imagery but also in serious 
media debates about male disadvantage, fathers’ rights, domestic violence, 
childcare and anti-social behaviour. brain size, serotonin, testosterone, 
endorphins, bipolarity and synaptic connections are terms no longer con-
fined to the specialist lexicons of psychiatry, neuroscience or biochemistry 
but have become the staple fodder of discussions about men, women and 
the relationships between them on a host of popular daytime talk shows 
and phone-in radio programmes. To take just a few examples:
biologically, whether feminists like it or not, boys are genetically more 
disposed than girls to achieve academically. On average, men’s brains are 
15 per cent larger than women’s, which is roughly twice the difference in 
physical proportions. (John Waters, Irish Times, 27 August 2001)
We have forgotten that social structure is what protects males from 
the volatility of their nature…. The young males of all primate species 
indulge in heart-stopping risk-taking and experimentation…. The peak 
of aggressive ness and antisocial behaviour occurs in the late teens and 
early 20s, corresponding to the peak of testosterone at that age. (Maureen 
Gaffney, Irish Times, 28 February 2004)
It’s a woman’s primary role to nurture…. Women by temperament are 
more caring, more forgiving, more tolerant and have a greater empathy 
with the children that they have given life to. (eamon Dunphy, Ryan 
Tubridy Morning Show, 7 December 2006)
These commentators are not exceptional voices: their opinions and the 
discursive parameters within which they are framed are part of a much 
wider shift towards essentialist thinking in science, therapy and popular 
culture (Rosalind Gill, 2003: 50–1) that is characteristic of most advanced 
capitalist societies today. According to Maija Holmer nadesan:
More recently, the public has been bombarded with a ‘scientific’ discourse 
that implies a bio-genetic essentialism through its explication of  phenomena 
such as intelligence, sexuality and aggression as neural- biological outcomes 
of genetic factors affected by natural selection. (Holmer nadesan 2002: 403)
Why, however, is this prioritisation of the biological over the social so 
attractive and conducive to a neoliberal economy? For Holmer nadesan, 
the objectives and outcomes of such a discursive shift are clear: because 
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‘the discourse of “brain science” renders populations visible in new ways’, 
it enables them to be problematised and subsequently dealt with in a 
manner that legitimises the extension of governmentality over potentially 
threatening populations. Thus, hyperactive children can be managed with 
Ritalin rather than through radical changes to diet, parenting or state- 
supported services. Depression, conceived of as a chemical imbalance, can 
be addressed through quick-fix medication rather than through costly and 
time-consuming qualitative research on how the pressures of modern life 
affect people’s sense of self-worth. Similarly, biochemical explanations for 
criminality, particularly in relation to young men, can be used to justify 
heightened surveillance and tougher jail sentences, while the social causes 
of male marginalisation are ignored. 
besides fostering complex and ostensibly non-invasive forms of govern-
mentality, however, it is important to recognise that ‘brain science’ is 
inextricably bound up in the logic of everyday consumerism.3 This is well 
illustrated by an article written by psychologist Maureen Gaffney in the 
Irish Times magazine, in which she claims that women fall in love with 
shoes and handbags not because they have been relentlessly objectified 
by western visual culture for hundreds of years or aggressively targeted by 
modern advertising since its inception, but because they are ‘fulfilling their 
evolutionary destiny’ (Gaffney, 2007a). According to Gaffney, women in 
early human societies:
specialised in child rearing, nesting and foraging for food, while males 
hunted for meat and defended their territory. by necessity women evolved 
to have better peripheral vision than men, enabling them to see in a wider 
arc and monitor any danger approaching the nest or any subtle changes in 
the environment.
She goes on to explain that these sensory skills make women:
avid and effective foragers of luxury goods…. Women lovingly fondle silk 
and cashmere, sniff perfume with a look of rapt attention on their faces, 
and talk about colours such as taupe and eau de nil.
In Ireland, as in britain and the United States, the shift towards neo-
liberal government and its concurrent commercialisation of the media-scape 
have been key drivers in facilitating the discursive and representational 
repolarisation of gender. The trajectory from a public-service broadcasting 
model to one whose core objective is to sell audiences to advertisers sets 
up an entirely new dynamic between the broadcast media and their audi-
ences. As well as marginalising those demographic groups that are of little 
interest to advertisers, this model addresses consumers in increasingly 
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gender-reductive ways. This is particularly evident in the growth of gender-
specific cultural genres such as chick-lit, chick-flicks and lad mags, as well 
as in the way television programming is becoming increasingly organised 
around the marketing not only of gender-specific products but also of 
new, gender-specific viewing contexts. The launch of Channel 6 (now 3e), 
Ireland’s first dedicated entertainment channel, is a case in point. Aimed 
at a core audience of fifteen- to thirty-four-year-olds, the station made 
clear the gendered niche markets it intended to deliver to advertisers. ‘boys 
night’ on a Tuesday evening was sponsored by Paddy Power bookmakers 
and featured the usual line-up of job- and  relationship-averse, yet sex- and 
soccer-hungry, ‘losers’ (Messner and Montez de Oca, 2005) who have come 
to characterise ‘Guyland’ (Kimmel, 2008). ‘Girls night’, on the other hand, 
was dominated by programmes such as Dharma and Greg and Sex and The 
City, with product-placement inserts showing female friends giggling and 
enjoying low-calorie sparkling drinks together.4 As Andrew Wernick (1991) 
has commented, the market has become the core organising principle of 
social life, giving rise to increasingly diffuse and convoluted forms of pro-
motional communication. Channel 6/3e exemplifies what Wernick refers to 
as promotional culture: it is not just the ads that are selling lifestyles, brands 
and identities but rather the entire televisual ‘supertext’ (browne, 1987). 
The formats supported by commercial media, therefore, are highly 
conducive to the use of simplified images and sound-bites. Ideas, on the 
other hand, which challenge common-sense assumptions are generally 
not media-friendly, since they require complex foregrounding and con-
textualisation (Herman and Chomsky, 1994). This partly explains why so 
much entertainment media space is currently taken up with the vox-pop 
‘surveys’ and diluted snippets of deeply flawed yet highly access ible and 
apparently objective scientific ‘facts’ that fuel the jokey, blokey antago-
nism characteristic of the rapport between male radio jocks and their 
female side-kicks. However, the complexity and media-unfriendliness of 
the alternatives are not the only reasons why genetic-determinist ideas 
have succeeded in assuming such a central, even banal, position in Irish 
social discourse. not only does the shift towards a ‘liberal’ gender-scape 
justify new forms of governmentality and generate highly lucrative mar-
kets in the sex, fashion, cosmetics and children’s toy industries, but it 
also frequently serves to free the state from assuming its responsibilities 
in promoting gender equality, in tackling the problems associated with 
social exclusion and in safeguarding children. The remainder of this 
chapter seeks to demonstrate in detail how free-market economics have 
conspired with a broadly post-feminist culture to support a distinctly 
neoliberal political agenda on gender which, beneath its liberal rhetoric, 
is both deeply regress ive and potentially highly coercive. 
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The post-feminist paradox
neoliberals, unlike conservatives, understand only too well that reac-
tionary interventions are not required to get reactionary results. Global 
market forces, when left to their own devices, will ensure that the world-
view of a powerful minority becomes normative: in other words, that 
the most reductive and most lucrative discursive constructions of gender 
will prevail. While these are generally also the most conservative ones, a 
number of key social and cultural shifts have occurred which ensure that 
they come packaged in a discourse of progress, empowerment and free 
choice. The most significant development of the past twenty years has been 
the trajectory from a feminist to a post-feminist framing of gender issues. 
This paradigm shift is colossal, not only because it repre sents a new set of 
assumptions about gender but also because it has effectively re located the 
discursive arena within which these assumptions are addressed, from the 
realm of the political to that of the cultural (Tasker and negra, 2007). 
According to Tasker and negra (2007: 1), ‘Postfeminism broadly encom-
passes a set of assumptions, widely disseminated within popular media 
forms, having to do with the “pastness” of feminism, whether that sup-
posed “pastness” is merely noted, mourned or celebrated’. They go on 
to explain that ‘Postfeminism does not always offer a logically coherent 
account of gender and power but through structures of forceful articula-
tion and synergistic reiteration across media forms it has emerged as a 
dominating discursive system’ (2007: 2–3). Unlike second-wave feminism, 
therefore, post-feminism cannot be understood either as a  distinct mode 
of political activism or as a coherently developed ideology, but rather as a 
set of discursive responses – often serving contradictory agendas – to the 
perceived successes and failures of feminism. 
Post-feminist culture is characterised by number of key developments. 
The first and most visible of these is its capitulation on feminism’s rejection 
of the sexual objectification of women. This is defended using a number 
of arguments – men are also objectified, regressive portrayals of women 
are ironic, feminism robbed women of their ‘innate’ femininity – some of 
which suggest a return to essentialist concepts of gender identity and most 
of which are deeply enmeshed within the logic of consumer capitalism 
and commodity fetishism (Ging, 2007). One outcome of this volte-face 
is that women no longer need to be liberated from the cosmetics and 
fashion industries, since freedom, in the post-feminist scheme of things, 
is most readily expressed in terms of the ability to consume, as L’Oréal’s 
ubiquitous advertising campaign so frequently reminds us (‘because you’re 
worth it’). Perhaps the most important defining feature of post-feminism, 
however, is the widespread acceptance of the myth that gender equality 
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has been won, in spite of the fact that Irish women continue to be under-
represented in politics, industry and the professions, and continue to 
earn less than men (Central Statistics Office, 2006). Indeed, it is upon 
this optimistic rhetoric of the ‘level playing field’ (McMahon, 1999) that 
many of the more flagrant inequities and contradictions of the contem-
porary gender-scape are often justified. now that what is (re)imagined as 
a harsh, humourless feminism is past, the dual discourses of equality and 
empowerment facilitate a more flexible and playful discussion of gender: it 
has thus become acceptable to claim that men are from Mars and women 
are from Venus, to view lap-dancing as liberating or to assume that women 
retreat from public life on the basis of empowered choices. At the level of 
cultural representation, which, as Tasker and negra (2007) rightly point 
out, is post-feminism’s central discursive arena, this has brought about a 
proliferation of images of women as variously self-indulgent, narcissistic, 
irrational, hypersexualised and often violent creatures who conflate porn-
ography with freedom and consumerism with self-worth.
Finally, post-feminist culture tends to be underpinned by a post-
modern aesthetics of parody, pastiche and irony (Whelehan, 2000; 
Tasker and negra, 2007), which is by no means coincidental. As 
Whelehan (2000) has so cogently illustrated, using irony to underscore 
post-feminist culture’s many contradictions and ‘trouble spots’ has served 
as a useful escape clause against claims of sexism, elitism and gender 
essentialism. It is against this particular cultural, political and economic 
backdrop that the mainstreaming of a pornographic aesthetic has been 
possible in Ireland: the Wonderbra phenomenon, which stirred up a 
degree of controversy in the early 1990s, has since been widely appro-
priated by Irish advertising agencies to sell everything from yoghurt 
to holidays. Scantily clad women drape themselves over cars at the 
annual ‘Toys 4 big boys’ exhibition at the RDS (Royal Dublin Society 
exhibition Centre), in the style of 1970s soft pornography. Posters in 
third-level institutes of education advertising every thing from hiking 
clubs to debating society events feature wide-eyed, pouting females in 
bikinis. Post-feminism gives us a fun take on porn, premised upon the 
notion that a minority of humourless, embittered feminists lost out to a 
more open-minded and progressive lobby. 
It is important to point out, however, that this analysis does not assume 
a top-down, ‘hypodermic needle’ model of media influence. We cannot 
conclude, simply because certain discourses and images have become 
widespread, popular or accepted, that they are being interpreted or used 
in uniform ways. As strategies for the advancement of gender equality go, 
‘girl power’ may be a deeply flawed concept, but that is not to say it does 
not help many pre-pubescent and adolescent females to negotiate some of 
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the limitations imposed on them by traditional, more passive models of 
femininity. As Flanagan and booth (2002: 3) have pointed out in relation 
to the new images of hypersexualised and often violent femininity that 
prevail in cyberspace, the discursive terrain of popular culture is ‘a space 
in which there is oppression as well as room for tactical and oppositional 
manoevres’. Similarly, media images that celebrate tough, underclass 
mascu lin ities, such as those found in gangster films or rap music, may 
serve to valorise the identities of young, marginalised men (Ging, 2006, 
2007b) who more readily find themselves demonised in the news media 
(Devlin, 2000). Without concrete empirical studies of its reception, how-
ever, we know very little about how ironic gender stereotyping is actually 
being understood. In two substantial studies about men’s media consump-
tion and film-viewing practices (Ging, 2005, 2007b), there was very little 
evidence that contemporary images of male machismo and female sub-
missiveness were understood as tongue-in-cheek references to yesterday’s 
gender norms. On the contrary, the research showed that ironic sexism 
was poorly understood – at best, irony was used as shorthand for ‘don’t 
take things too seriously’ – since the back story of lad culture’s humorously 
antagonistic interplay with feminism is clearly something that happened 
too long ago to have any real meaning for fifteen- to twenty-four-year-old 
male audiences (Gauntlett, 2002). 
In Ireland, the broadly celebratory acceptance of the commercialisation 
of sex may have been intensified by a collective sense of liberation from 
a censorious and highly repressive brand of Catholicism. However, that 
both the political and the visual economies of pornography remain highly 
male dominated is consistently evaded in the rhetoric of liberalism, as are 
the everyday realities of the abuse and exploitation of women in the sex 
industry. Certainly, there is an important distinction to be made between 
pornography and prostitution, yet, as Kon and Riordan (1996) point 
out in the context of eastern europe, pornography’s overt commodifica-
tion of women’s bodies has contributed significantly to the reassertion 
of patriarchy and of a burgeoning sex industry. The Irish studies cited 
above indicate that most young Irish men mobilise liberal rhetoric when 
discussing pornography, wherein it is generally agreed that women do 
this kind of work out of choice – ‘They’re getting paid’, ‘They chose their 
career’, ‘They’re not complaining’. However, a majority of the study par-
ticipants were also deeply uncomfortable with the idea of their girlfriends, 
mothers or daughters engaging in such activities. This double-speak is 
perhaps one of the most confounding paradoxes of the new liberalism. 
Irish women may be finally freed from Catholicism but they must now 
negotiate the dual forces of bio-determinism and commodification, which 
have equally high stakes in the regulation of their bodies.
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Hard-wiring masculinity
nowhere is the language of genetic determinism so prevalent as in contem-
porary discourses about Irish men and masculinity. In recent years, Irish 
Times journalist John Waters has been to the fore in extolling the virtues of 
the mythopoetic strand of the men’s movement, made famous by Robert 
bly’s highly influential bestseller Iron John (1992). bly’s argument is prem-
ised on the notion of innate masculine characteristics: he contends that 
women have become too involved in the ‘civilising’ of men and that, if con-
temporary social ills are to be tackled, men must reclaim their lost power 
and reject ‘feminine’ influences such as excessive emotion, sensitivity or 
indecisiveness. Most of the American men’s groups and the literatures they 
have produced have been founded by and cater to middle-class, and mostly 
white, American men, whose response to social change has been described 
by Kimmel and Kaufman (1995: 263) as ‘the cry of anguish of privileged 
American men, men who feel lost in a world in which the ideol ogies of 
individualism and manly virtue are out of sync with the  realities of urban, 
industrialized, secular society’. The perception that men are becoming 
increasingly feminised and disempowered is central to a politics of gender 
that is underpinned by strict sex-role stereotyping based on biological dif-
ference. Men’s relationship to the feminine is thus a crucial dividing factor: 
while most sociologists and psychologists argue that it is men’s suppression 
of the feminine and the imperative to strive towards an illusory masculine 
ideal that is at the root of male social problems such as juvenile crime, 
alcohol and drug abuse, suicide and mid-life crisis (Horrocks, 1994, 1995; 
Clare, 2000), others contend that criminality and social problems arise 
from modern society’s failure to raise young boys according to a strict 
model of traditional masculinity, which prioritises paternal authority and 
represses the feminine (bly, 1992;  Farrell, 1993, 1999).
In Ireland, what Harry Ferguson (2002) has referred to as the ‘social 
problematisation of masculinity’ has occurred around a number of ‘flash-
point’ issues, including male violence and anti-social behaviour, the alleged 
feminisation of education, fathers’ rights and male suicide. What is striking 
about the framing of these debates is the way in which they have been 
underpinned by the gender-essentialist rhetoric of the American men’s 
movement5 and of self-help literature, which has banded with a reactionary 
Catholic lobby to produce a highly volatile and distorted public discussion 
on these issues. As Anne Cleary’s (2005) work has shown, suicide has been 
discussed and debated predominantly along the lines of gender, with male 
suicide being constructed as a response to men’s inability to deal with 
advances in female power. Factors such as social class, sexuality, alcohol 
and drug use and urban/rural location, which might have carved up the 
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picture in a significantly different way, were largely ignored in this debate, 
although they are beginning to emerge in more recent public discourse. 
According to Cleary (2005: 156), ‘A binary divide between masculinity and 
femininity drives much research around emotional and psychological issues 
despite contrary evidence about the across-gender fluidity of emotional 
lives’ ( Connell, 2002; Frosh et al., 2002).
This essentialism is also prevalent in recent debates about male violence 
and anti-social behaviour in Ireland. As Maurice Devlin (2000) has pointed 
out, working-class male youths are routinely pathologised in the Irish news 
media, and the young male is constructed ‘as a belligerent, wilful crea-
ture, naturally avaricious and aggressive, in need of constant punishment 
if he is to learn the “avoidance of transgression”’ (Mariani, 1996: 136). 
With increasing evidence of anti-social behaviour among young middle-
class men, this rhetoric of gender determinism has become even more 
commonplace, as it helps to evade more probing questions about social 
maginalisation and its causes, while at the same time justifying the need for 
increased levels of parental and state authority. During the brian Murphy 
trial,6 for example, psychologist Maureen Gaffney attributed the upsurge 
in this type of male violence to ‘a collapse of the old authority structures’, 
which, she claimed, has allowed young men’s ‘natural’  testosterone-fuelled 
aggression to go unchecked and untamed. In line with much bio-
determinist thinking on gender, analogies with the animal kingdom were 
implied, so that her account of homosocial male behaviour read much like 
the voice-over for a nature documentary. She wrote:
In the competition for women, testosterone rises, as though to mobilise the 
male for the rivalry ahead. (Correspondingly, testosterone falls in men who 
are approaching marriage and withdrawing from the competitive world of 
seeking a mate.) (Irish Times, 28 February 2004)
However, as Mariani points out:
The fact that antisociality itself is a culturally-constructed concept has 
been buried under an avalanche of research purporting to locate its cause 
in ‘individual vulnerabilities’ that give rise to personality syndromes like 
attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (AHDH), conduct disorder (CD), 
oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), and antisocial personality disorder 
(APD). (Mariani 1996: 136)
In recent years, a proliferation of television documentaries, such as Why 
Men Don’t Iron (Channel 4, 1998) and Testosterone (Channel 4, 2003), 
have used ‘brain science’ to mobilise biological essentialist theories of 
gender and to establish links between testosterone and male aggression. 
According to Mariani, this is a complex way of liberating governments of 
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responsibility for the damage caused by hegemonic masculinity, and of 
securing the patriarchal status quo. She contends that biological essentialist 
accounts of criminality (‘bio-criminology’), by focusing on congenital dis-
orders in the young, downplay the role of environmental and sociological 
factors: thus, the behaviours of abused children and poor black children 
– ‘any child ready to point an accusing finger at the system’ (Mariani, 
1996: 143) – are more readily attributed to congenital neurotransmitter 
dysfunction or to brain injury incurred in the birth canal (since, it is 
claimed, in utero exposure to testosterone makes the male brain less pliant 
than the female brain and thus more susceptible to injury in the birth 
canal) than to abusive or dysfunctional childhoods. While the research 
acknowledges that socially excluded males are more prone to anti-social 
behaviour, the prevailing view is that environmental factors are primarily 
catalysts or triggers that affect only susceptible individuals. Mariani claims 
that cultural and sociological explanations, which see excessive discipline 
and the repression of emotion as the problem, have been eclipsed by 
biological essentialist and individualising frameworks, which function to 
justify stricter disciplinary measures. Pathologising the problem of white 
boys out of control, she maintains, is a way of explaining, containing and 
treating anti-social behaviour, for example by putting them on Ritalin, 
which has obvious benefits for the pharmaceutical industry, while at the 
same time maintaining the patriarchal order of things:
Thus, tramps ride the rails, not because a cataclysmic economic  depression 
has thrown them out of work, but to satisfy a perverse pleasure in vaga-
bondage arising from ‘defective inhibition’. The ‘delinquent’ runaway is 
impelled by a congenital contempt for authority, not the nightmare of 
savage beatings. (Mariani, 1996: 147)
‘Raunch culture’ for the under-twelves 
The rise of genetic determinism and of ‘raunch culture’ (Levy, 2005) raises 
even more important questions about children, who are neither familiar 
with the ideological back stories of lad culture and post-feminism nor 
capable of detecting and successfully decoding irony. In Ireland, the chil-
dren’s media, fashion and toy industries have been hugely influenced by 
American imports over the past twenty years, which has succeeded in 
creating highly gender-polarised markets through processes of consump-
tion. Gender-neutral clothing and toys have all but disappeared from 
Irish shops, while the gender coding of advertisements for toys and games 
has become so extreme that television advertising and product packaging 
rarely depict male and female children playing together.7 At the level 
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of media representation, girls are becoming increasingly sexualised and 
passive, while boys are depicted as rejecting emotion and engaging in 
exaggerated performances of aggression and bravado. Against the wider 
backdrop of a dominant discourse of genetic determinism, this state of 
affairs is often presented as natural, even inevitable.8
There is no conclusive evidence, however, to support the hypothesis 
that girls and boys have natural or genetic predilections for different types 
of play, while there is a considerable body of research which shows that 
social conditioning – through parents, carers, teachers, peers and media 
images – is the primary cause of differentiated gender behaviours (Condry 
and Condry, 1976; Hyde, 1981, 1984, 1985, 2005; Giddens, 1982, 2001; 
West and Zimmerman, 1987; Lightdale and Prentice, 1994; epstein and 
Johnson, 1994; Hyde and Plant, 1995; Steele, 1997; epstein, 1998; Frome 
and eccles, 1998; Kimmel, 2000; Sandberg and Pramling-Samuelsson, 
2005). Those parents who resign themselves to the genetic ‘inevitability’ 
of their children’s orientation toward sex-specific toys and games might 
ask themselves why, if boys are hard-wired to play with guns and girls’ 
predilection for barbies is genetically ordained, so much money needs to 
be spent on such aggressive marketing and forceful colour coding of these 
products. Moreover, those who actively discourage their male children 
from playing with female-coded toys surely need not worry: if masculine 
traits are encoded into the male genes from conception, superficial acts 
such as playing with dolls or tea sets should not, according to this logic, 
upset the child’s hard-wired, biologically destined masculinity.
The blatant sexualisation of girlhood in child-directed advertising and 
marketing imagery raises further questions about consumerism’s impact on 
children’s self-identity. High-heeled shoes and boots are available in many 
Irish shoe shops for children aged five and upwards. T-shirts with ‘porn 
star’ written across the chest are widely available for the same age group. 
Major chain-stores sell g-string and bra sets for girls ranging from five to 
ten years of age. bratz dolls, now far exceeding sales of barbie, combine 
pre-pubescent, wide-eyed innocence with the clothing and make-up of the 
prostitute or dominatrix.9 Increasingly, seven-year-old girls making their 
Holy Communion use highlights and fake tanning. 
There is a confounding double-speak at work here, whereby viewing 
paedophile images is a serious crime but using a paedophile aesthetic to sell 
toys and make-up to children is not. For all its rhetoric about a society of 
free choice that engenders liberal, open debate, post-Celtic-Tiger Ireland 
has not yet succeeded in having an honest public discussion about this 
topic. Paedophilia is portrayed by the Irish media as transgressive, abject 
or ‘other’, with paedophiles routinely constructed as anti-social ‘outsiders’, 
(homo)sexually repressed priests or disturbed celebrities. According to 
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Harry Ferguson (2002), the revelations of clerical abuse by the media, 
while they have played a crucial role in giving voice to those who have 
been silenced by an oppressive, autocratic and deeply patriarchal culture, 
have also served the skew the realities of child abuse in Ireland:10
The ‘paedophile priest’ has become a key symbol of danger to children, 
a social construction which is entirely a media event implying clear links 
between celibacy and child sexual abuse. Significantly, while there are 
many more convicted sex offenders who are married heterosexual men, 
malestream [sic] heterosexual masculinity within and without the Irish 
family has not been problematised. (Ferguson, 2001: 43)
The point here is not to argue for a causal link between the media’s sexualis-
ation of children and the incidence of paedophilia. There is no evidence 
to support such a link, and it is worth noting that children have been 
sexually abused throughout history, irrespective of how they were dressed. 
There is also an important distinction to be made between the production 
of images that involves the physical or emotional harming of children and 
that which does not. nonetheless, research conducted in Canada (Steed, 
1994: 138) shows that as adult sex offenders ‘got older, they found their 
predilec tions reinforced by mainstream culture, movies and rock videos 
that glorify violent males who dominate younger, weaker sex objects’. 
What is of more concern here, however, is the potential impact of medi-
ated mess ages that boys do things and girls look pretty on how people 
think about children and on how children think about themselves. Given 
the tendency documented in the psychological literature for most victims 
of abuse to feel varying levels of guilt or responsibility for what has hap-
pened, the media’s sexualisation of pre-adolescent girls is unlikely help 
children in tackling abuse or sexual harassment. Teaching girls to view 
themselves as passive sexual objects, albeit heavily cloaked in girl power’s 
lippy catch-phrases, is unlikely to equip them with the confidence or sense 
of self required to deal with the realities of female sexual objectification or 
to make them feel that society valorises and supports their resistance. 
In the absence of concrete ethnographies of reception, however, the 
impact of such imagery on the attitudes and behaviours of children as they 
develop remains unclear. Certainly, research shows that children are dis-
cerning and media-savvy consumers of popular culture. However, while boys 
and girls actively use what they consume – clothes, toys, games – to con-
struct their identities, the extreme gender coding of these products arguably 
limits the repertoires from which they feel they can choose. Peer pressure, 
combined with the widespread popularity of gender-determinist thinking, 
would appear to make it difficult, especially for boys, to experiment or cross 
boundaries. This gender ‘straight-jacketing’ is arguably at odds with the 
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notion that, as adults, these men and women will have equal status in their 
jobs or be able to conduct egalitarian relationships. In this micro-universe 
of Power Rangers and bratz, it appears that the seeds are being sown for a 
highly lucrative future market of adult men and women who understand 
themselves as polarised, incompatible and unable to communicate. Today’s 
children are set to become tomorrow’s self-help generation.
When Venus and Mars collide: the self-help solution
The explosion in self-help literature, CDs and DVDs is both a cause 
and a symptom of the new essentialism, and the impact of bestselling 
books such as John Gray’s Men Are From Mars, Women Are From Venus 
(1993) and Deborah Tannen’s You Just Don’t Understand: Men and Women 
in Conversation (2001) cannot be underestimated. As Michael Cronin 
demonstrates in chapter 7 of this volume, the creation of anxieties around 
modern living makes individuals increasingly dependent on private or 
corporate solutions. Rather than questioning the structural causes of 
gender in equality and instigating social change, transformation takes 
place through the individual consumption of (self-help) therapy. While 
most self-help therapies that address problems of gender relations give 
the impression of taking radical individual action to change things, they 
ultimately serve to preserve the status quo. Instead of tackling the root 
causes of inequality, they teach individuals how to gloss over and live with 
the symptoms. explanations of men and women as coming from different 
planets fit with common-sense assumptions, and do not challenge the 
existing economic and social structures into which people have become 
enmeshed. From the new Age-inflected literature, which draws upon 
theories of yin and yang, to the Christian end of the self-help market, 
with its call for a return to wifely subservience, this literature consist-
ently ignores the social in favour of the biological.11 Most importantly, 
because the supposed incompatibilities between the sexes are presented 
as ordained, the demand for dating  agencies, self-help books and sex and 
relationship counselling is potentially infinite. Love, sex and procreation 
have become highly complex emotional danger zones, which the common 
human apparently cannot negotiate without the help of ‘expertise’.
The new essentialism has taken root in the Irish media to such an 
extent that reviews of self-help literature have ceased even to acknowledge 
that the ‘nature thesis’ might be contentious. In a recent Irish Times review 
of a book entitled Babyproofing Your Marriage, co-authored by Irishwoman 
Cathy O’neill and two other mothers who found their relationships 
coming under strain after the birth of their children, Kate Holmquist 
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(2007) fails to question any of the deeply problematic theories and 
method ol ogies upon which the book is based. Like the raft of other self-
help books which ostensibly critique yet in reality rehearse and perpetuate 
myths about motherhood,12 these approaches ensure that childcare and 
home-making remain the emotional responsibility of women. Manuals 
about balancing family life and work aimed at men do not exist, nor does 
anybody seem to think they should. The eternal post-feminist conun-
drum – of how to juggle children and career – is thus constructed as a 
problem exclusively for women. Paradoxically, it is a common feature of 
much post-feminist discourse to blame feminism for landing women with 
this ‘second shift’, while refusing to acknowledge that the real source of the 
problem lies with both men’s and women’s unwillingness or inability to 
divide housework and childcare equally.13 As Anthony McMahon (1999) 
has so cogently illustrated, the dominance of a progressive or optimistic 
rhetoric of gender equality has effectively blocked progress on these issues. 
Though it is difficult to measure, the influence of self-help therapies has 
undoubtedly been instrumental in compounding and sustaining the cen-
trality of post-feminist and bio-determinist discourses in Ireland. 
Finally, the gender-difference hypothesis provides industry and the 
professions with a useful strategy for channelling women in and out of 
the workforce as economic needs arise. Increasingly, it is also used within 
industry to encourage women into particular types of activity as well to 
allow companies to score corporate and social responsibility points for 
their ostensibly pro-female policies. An article on the Microsoft website 
uses ‘brain science’ to claim that women make better managers:
In the past few decades, researchers have discovered physiological vari-
ations in the brains of men and women. For example, male brains are 
about 10% larger than female brains. but women have more nerve cells in 
certain areas. Women also tend to have a larger corpus collusum [sic] – the 
group of nerve fibers that connects left and right hemispheres. That makes 
women faster at transferring data between the computational, verbal left 
half and the intuitive, visual right half. Result: Women are more flexible 
and find it easier to multitask. Men are usually left-brain oriented. That 
often makes then better at solving abstract equations and problems.14
As Aileen O’Carroll (2006) points out, an almost identical discourse was 
also used by the president of Harvard in 2005 to explain why women 
were under-represented in science. Under his presidency, the number of 
tenured jobs offered to women at Harvard dropped from 36 per cent to 13 
per cent. O’Carroll makes a crucial point:
The idea of gender differences can be used to either exclude women (as in 
the position of women in Harvard) or to attract more women (as in the call 
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centre workers). The malleability of the idea of difference, and the different 
political uses to which it is put, should make us very wary of arguments 
that take difference as their starting point.
Conclusion
The Celtic Tiger years have led us into new discursive arenas, in which ideo-
logical consensus is increasingly achieved at the level of the symbolic, the 
rhetorical and the discursive. Although it is difficult to determine or measure 
the extent to which consumerism and its associated imageries are affecting 
how people actually ‘do gender’ in their daily lives (West and  Zimmerman, 
1987), there is widespread evidence to suggest that attitudes to gender 
are being (re)constructed through subtle processes of consumption and 
economic rationalisation, which are channelled through an increasingly 
profit-driven media. As Phelan, drawing on billig’s (1995) work, points out 
in chapter 5, ideological production is sometimes most usefully concep-
tualised in terms of ‘banal’ representational practices, rather than through 
indices of explicit, or intentional, neoliberal bias. The rising popularity of 
bio-determinism across a wide range of interconnected industries – from 
self-help therapy to computer games – means that these ideas infiltrate our 
lives and relationships in subtle but presumably significant ways. 
Rather than adopting a fatalistic liberal response to these develop-
ments, however, Irish people have the possibility to intervene or to call for 
intervention. At the level of education, the educate Together model is an 
excellent example of collective self-determination, whereby parents and 
educators have formed democratically run cooperative schools based on 
the principles of gender equality and cultural inclusion. At secondary level, 
there is an ongoing and urgent need for further gender mainstreaming 
initiatives such as those already implemented by the Gender equality Unit 
of the Department of education. However, if these are to succeed, both 
parents and teachers must confront their own prejudices in relation to 
gender and actively tackle the subtle instances of sexism and homophobia 
which too often go unchecked. As Sadker and Sadker’s (1994) three-year 
study in the United States so aptly demonstrates, teachers who consider 
themselves to be gender egalitarian are often not conscious of the vastly 
different ways in which they treat boys and girls. In recent years, the non-
secular nature of Irish education has been highlighted by the Congress of 
Catholic Secondary Schools Parents’ rejection of the exploring Mascu-
linities programme, on the grounds that it encourages positive attitudes to 
homosexuality and gay marriage (Oliver, 2001). In this context, popular 
discourses of progress and inclusion are especially paradoxical. 
68 Debbie Ging
Furthermore, there is a need for increased lobbying on the part of 
parents to have child-directed advertising on Irish television banned. The 
broadcasting Commission of Ireland’s children’s advertising code prohibits 
celebrities from advertising food or drink for children and stipulates that 
advertisements for fast food must carry a health warning (Shaw, 2004). 
However, this is far cry from the Swedish model, which has banned all 
advertising to children under twelve years of age, and from countries such 
as norway, Austria, belgium and Denmark, which impose tight restrictions 
on advertising around children’s programmes. However, given that roughly 
50 per cent of Irish children watch non-Irish channels (Shaw, 2004) and the 
internet presents another vast source of advertising, it is clearly not possible 
to protect children from what has become a widely promotional culture 
(Wernick, 1991). Increasingly, efforts and resources need to be devoted to 
the teaching of critical media literacy in schools. While a media component 
has been introduced into the primary curricu lum and into the english 
syllabus for the Junior and Leaving Certificates (O’neill, 2000), this is 
far from adequate, given the extent to which young people engage with 
mediated messages and images on a daily basis. To date, a more vocational 
and market-oriented emphasis on digital literacy has tended to overshadow 
a more critically oriented model, and there is clearly a growing need to 
involve students in the broader philosophical, ideological and political 
debates around modern mass media. As media reception research with male 
teenagers in Ireland has shown (Ging, 2005), evidence of media literacy is 
by no means synonymous with an ability to decode media ideologically. 
Thus, the introduction of media studies curricula which foster a culture of 
critical reflection and questioning is one very tangible way in which educa-
tion policy might respond to the growing gender apartheid facing children.
Related to this is the need for an open discussion about the sexu-
alisation of children through consumerism and the way in which the 
mainstreaming of a pornographic aesthetic is (re)constructing – at least 
discursively – male and female sexuality and desire. Research (Ging, 2005) 
indicates that many young men are blind to the gaze economy of popular 
culture, which dictates that it is still mostly men who look and women 
who are looked at, and so it is important to render consistently visible 
the inconsistencies and paradoxes of the post-feminist rhetoric of the 
level playing field or ‘ground zero’ (Kimmel, 2008). Finally, it is crucial 
that men become involved in the debate about childcare, and that male 
accounts of the pressures of balancing career and childcare are acknowl-
edged and listened to. It is also up to women to facilitate the sharing of 
this responsibility, by rejecting the unbalanced and limiting parameters 
within which the debate has been framed by self-help literature, women’s 
magazines and post-feminist discourse generally. 
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The increasingly commercial media-scape in Ireland has enabled 
deeply conservative images and ideologies of gender to proliferate. Mean-
while, the increased visibility of homosexuality, the perceived freedoms 
of ‘raunch culture’ and the broad acceptance of the myth that equality 
has been achieved have serviced a convincing rhetoric of progress and, 
in doing so, have ultimately served to gloss over the persistence of sub-
stantial material inequalities between men and women. In addition to 
this, neoliberalism’s mutually beneficial rapport with bio-determinism 
has arguably diminished the responsibility of the government vis-à-vis 
a range of social problems, including crime, anti-social behaviour, social 
exclusion and paedophilia, since it locates these problems in the genes, 
hormones or brainwaves of individual bodies. 
While the successes of feminism have been undoubtedly monumental, 
they have also been dramatically overplayed by the popular media, with 
the result that the feminist movement is either held in contempt or is 
considered to have been so successful as to have rendered itself obsolete, or 
both. Indeed, the expediency with which a complacent and often regres-
sive discourse on gender has assumed centre stage in the last decade in 
Ireland is extraordinary. That said, blunt ‘hypodermic needle’ models, 
which assume that people passively absorb media messages, do not account 
for the complexity of our engagements with mass culture. Considerable 
research remains to be done on how genetic-determinist and post-feminist 
discourses are influencing the ways in which we think about and ‘do 
gender’ in Ireland. Until we begin to explore in detail the actual meanings 
and uses generated by post-feminist images and discourses, as well as by 
Mars–Venus accounts of gender relations, it remains unclear whether and 
to what extent Irish people will accept, resist or negotiate the messages of 
a highly Americanised consumer culture, in which men and women are 
being increasingly constructed as polarised rather than united.
Notes
 1 It is important to stress from the outset that this chapter is not an attempt to con-
vince the reader that gender is socially and culturally constructed. A vast body of 
distinguished sociological and psychological researchers (among them John Condry 
and Sandra Condry, Anthony Giddens, Michael Kimmel, Michael Kaufmann, Harry 
brod, Janet Shelby-Hyde, Lynne Segal, Máirtin Mac an Ghaill, Chris Haywood, 
Raewyn Connell, Margaret Matlin, Deborah Cameron and Judith butler) have long 
identified and discredited the flawed premises and methodologies upon which bio-
logical essentialist theories of gender difference are founded.
 2 In 2006, only 14 per cent of TDs in Dáil eireann were women, which is well below 
the average european Union rate of 23 per cent, and in 2004 women’s earnings were 
65.7 per cent of men’s (Central Statistics Office, 2006: 10).
70 Debbie Ging
 3 The brantano shoe company ran an advertising campaign in 2007 which featured a 
fictional institute founded by Professor Anne-Marie brantano, who first discovered 
the ‘slingback synapse’. This is a prime example of a discourse which straddles both 
ironic sexism and genetic determinism, thus simultaneously parodying and normal-
ising woman’s ‘natural’ disposition toward shoe shopping. 
 4 The website of Channel 6 (www.channel6.ie; the channel was rebranded 3e in 
 January 2009, http://3e.tv3.ie) proclaimed that ‘Channel 6 will aggressively advertise 
throughout launch year with a very substantial multi-platformed campaign designed 
to raise awareness of the station and direct viewers to particular shows and themed 
nights. This campaign will be advertised at weights previously unheard of in Ireland 
for a TV station.’ (http:// /about.whtm)
 5 The men’s movement is by no means a unified political grouping; it also has radically 
different connotations in different parts of the world. In spite of this, the expression 
been used predominantly in the media as an umbrella term to describe those men’s 
groups whose agendas include – at a political level – the recuperation of male power 
and privilege (usurped by feminism) and/or – at a personal level – the rediscovery of 
the ‘masculine self ’. 
 6 brian Murphy, aged eighteen, was kicked and beaten to death outside a nightclub in 
south County Dublin in August 2000. His assailants were young middle-class men 
and the attack was apparently without motive.
 7 Irish advertising to children is virtually unregulated. The broadcasting Commission 
of Ireland has succeeded in banning only advertising for junk food products that are 
endorsed by celebrities or cartoon characters.
 8 See, for example, Kate Holmquist’s article in the Irish Times, 3 november 2007, in 
which she argues that the sexism in toy advertising is justified because boys and girls 
are hard-wired to be different. boys, she argues illogically, should not be encouraged 
to play with tea sets and ironing boards because they will have to do enough ironing 
and cooking when, as adults, they discover that women will no longer iron their shirts 
or serve them dinner. Why, in that case, girls should be given these toys is unclear. 
Holmquist concludes her article, with a 180-degree turn, by claiming that children 
have never been more aware of the fluid nature of gender identification, evidenced by 
the increasingly inventive ways in which they play with flexible notions of gender!
 9 bratz babies come accessorised with nappies, bottles and rattles as well as earrings, 
make-up and handbags.
 10 Statistics from the Dublin Rape Crisis Centre show that, in 2005, 19.6 per cent of 
reported child sexual abuse cases were perpetrated by fathers, 16.2 per cent by brothers, 
26.8 per cent by another male relative and 30.2 per cent by another known person. Only 
3.4 per cent of cases were perpetrated by strangers (Dublin Rape Crisis Centre, 2005).
 11 examples are Laura Doyle, The Surrendered Wife: A Practical Guide to Finding Intimacy, 
Passion, and Peace With a Man (2001), and Leanne Payne, Crisis in Masculinity (1995).
 12 See also Susan Maushart, The Mask of Motherhood: How Becoming a Mother Changes 
Our Lives and Why We Never Talk About It (1999), and Joan Williams Unbending 
Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do About It (2000).
 13 A report launched by the equality Authority in June 2008 shows that significant 
in equalities persist in Ireland – to the disadvantage of women – in terms of the amount 
of paid and unpaid work done by men and women (equality Authority, 2008). 
 14 Microsoft Small business Centre, at www.microsoft.com/smallbusiness/resources/
management/leadership_training/do_women_make_better_managers.mspx (accessed 
15 February 2007).
